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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, President Carter signed the first hazardous waste
cleanup bill into law.' The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) serves as a tool for government cleanup of hazardous waste sites, but those who anxiously
waited for Congress to pass a hazardous waste cleanup bill were disappointed with the final bill. 2 The proposed bill had been broadly
3

compromised.

The lack of legislative history indicates the rushed process
through which Congress passed the bill. 4 Like a game show contest-

ant who must accept or reject what is behind the door without knowing exactly what it entails, the House had to either pass or reject the
bill without the opportunity for revisions or comments. A bipartisan
Senate group wrote and passed the revised bill, and then, under a
suspension of the rule that prohibited amendments, placed it before
the House as an amendment to the earlier House Bill. 5 After waiting
over three years for the Senate to enact a hazardous waste cleanup
bill, the House faced two options: it could accept this complicated bill
or risk three more years of debate during which time no hazardous
waste cleanup legislation would exist.
The fact that the Senate essentially "snuck" CERCLA through
Congress partially explains why Congress appears to have left some
pertinent issues unaddressed and why it left other issues unresolved
in the final bill.6 Although CERCLA provides a mechanism for government cleanup of hazardous waste sites, it does not provide a cause

1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp.
1991).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4682, 42 U.S.C. §§
6911a, 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1991). This Recent Development will refer alternatively to
sections of the Act as CERCLA §§ 101-405.
3. Comments from Senators and Representatives that reflect the needs of special interest
groups plague the little legislative history that exists. Due to the stake that special interest
groups have in the legislation and the potentially burdensome effect of the legislation, some issues
could not be resolved in the legislative process and others required significant compromises to
pass both houses of Congress.
4. Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980,8 Colum. J. Envir. L. 1, 1 (1982).
5. Id. Senator Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire expressed concern over the pressure
and rush under which the legislation was being adopted. 126 Cong. Rec. 30946 (1980). Although
this game show analogy may appear extreme, comments from Senators and Representatives
indicate it may be surprisingly representative of the legislative process through which Congress
enacted CERCLA.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
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of action for personal injury resulting from exposure to hazardous
waste.7
Congress created CERCLA in response to the ineffectiveness of
other federal legislation., Specifically, none of the existing federal
programs allowed the government to initiate an environmental
cleanup or held owners of. abandoned or inactive sites liable for the
cleanup costsY Congress recognized the need for a powerful statute
that would enable the government to clean up waste sites and then
recover the costs from the responsible parties. 10
CERCLA provides two methods for cleaning up hazardous
waste sites. First, the government can use money from the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund (Superfund)" to clean up a hazardous waste site12 and then sue the responsible party or parties to
recover the costs. 13 Alternatively, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) can order the responsible private parties to perform the
cleanup in cases in which an imminent danger to human health or the
14
environment exists.
CERCLA has two parts: (1) damage remedy provisions and (2)
liability provisions.' 5 No provision specifically allows private parties to
sue for damages for personal injuries; however, Section 107(a)(4)(B) of
CERCLA makes responsible parties liable for "any other necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan." 6 The problem raised, therefore, is to
determine what qualifies as "necessary costs of response"
The determination of "necessary costs of response" often is a
straightforward analysis. For example, imagine the following situation: Mr. X and Ms. Y live on two property lots adjacent to a hazardous waste site. If Mr. X has to monitor his backyard well for hazardous waste contamination, he can recover his costs under CERCLA. If
7. See id.
8. H. R. Rep. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6120 (1980).
9. 126 Cong. Rec. 30941 (1980).
10. Dan A. Tanenbaum, Comment, When Does Going to the Doctor Serve the Public Health?
Medical Monitoring Respon se Co8t8 Under CERCLA, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 925, 925-26 (1992) (citing
S. Rep. No. 96-848, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 11 (1980)).
11. Superfund is the popular name for this Act because it authorizes the institution of this
Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund. This Recent Development does not focus on the
parties' ability to recover under the Fund; therefore, it will refer to the Act as CERCLA.
12. Tanenbaum, Comment, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 926 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9611).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9607(a).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). The statute specifically authorizes agency action when there exists
"imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment
because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance .... " Id.
15. See Pub L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). The phrase "any other person" encompasses the government,
any state, and any Indian tribe. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
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Ms. Y seeks compensation for eye injuries caused by the hazardous
7
substance's release, however, she cannot recover her costs.
The more difficult question is whether Section 107(a)(4)(B) of
CERCLA provides for the recovery of medical monitoring expenses.
Individuals exposed to toxic substances often seek medical monitoring
to enable them to detect and treat latent diseases that may arise as a
result of the exposure. The process involves monitoring human bodies
and assessing the effects that hazardous wastes in the environment
have on the exposed persons. Medical monitoring costs, therefore, are
the quantifiable costs of periodic medical examinations necessary to
detect the onset of disease or other injury resulting from the hazardous substance release.
The district courts are split as to whether Section 107(a)(4)(B)
enables private individuals to recover medical monitoring costs 18 as a
"necessary cost of response." This Recent Development trudges
through the murky wording of CERCLA and analyzes the courts'
approaches to the recovery of medical monitoring costs under
CERCLA. 19
Part II of this Recent Development examines the district
courts' differing approaches to recovery and the resulting split in
authority. Part III analyzes the first federal appellate decision
considering the question of the recovery of medical monitoring expenses under CERCLA, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Daigle v. Shell
Oil Co.20 Part IV acknowledges that, as currently written, CERCLA
does not provide for medical monitoring costs. Because medical
monitoring is necessary to determine hazardous substances' effects on
persons and the environment, however, Part IV calls for the
legislature to amend CERCLA to allow recovery of medical monitoring
costs. Moreover, it argues that through this amendment Congress
will fulfill the goals of CERCLA by holding private parties responsible
for the true costs of their hazardous waste contamination.
17.
126 Cong. Rec. 30932 (1980) (comments of Sen. Randolph) (noting that the compromise
bill deleted the cause of action for personal injury). See also Grad, 8 Colum. J. Envir. L. at 21-22
(cited in note 4). As stated, the compensation issue in these situations is straightforward and
therefore is not considered in this Recent Development.
18. The courts do not explicitly define medical monitoring, but they suggest medical

monitoring consists of medical testing and screening conducted to assess the effect of the release
or discharge on public health or to identify potential public health problems presented by the
release. See Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D.Tenn. 1988), and Daiglev. Shell Oil
Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1534 (10th Cir. 1992).
19. Medical monitoring costs are distinguishable from medical expenses incurred in the
treatment of personal injuries or disease. CERCLA § 107(a), as indicated by the legislative
history, clearly does not permit recovery of these types of personal medical expenses. See 126
Cong. Rec. 14964 (1980); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
20. 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992).
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II. THE RECOVERY OF MEDICAL MONITORING COSTS--A QUAGMIRE OF
DECISIONS

District courts are split as to whether plaintiffs can recover
medical monitoring costs as "necessary costs of response" under
CERCLA. Three factors contribute to the district courts' approaches
toward medical monitoring costs. First, an important, but not determinative, factor is the court's view of CERCLA's purpose. Second,
courts consider the characterization of medical monitoring costs.
Courts that compare medical monitoring costs to a personal injury
remedy refuse to award medical monitoring expenses. 21 Third, and
most important, the court's interpretation of CERCLA's language
greatly affects its approach to the recovery of medical monitoring
costs.
Although related, all three factors deserve independent treatment because each factor influences the court's determination of the
recoverability of medical monitoring expenses differently. For example, whether a court examines the purpose of a statute depends on its
mode of statutory interpretation, but the purpose the court assigns to
the statute may relate very little to the court's method of statutory
interpretation. Because the first and second factors, the purpose the
court assigns to the statute and the characterization of medical monitoring costs, overlap with the issue of statutory interpretation, and
because the reader must understand the distinctions between various
methods of statutory interpretation to understand the analysis of
courts' interpretations of Section 107(a)(4)(B), the next subpart examines the competing methods of statutory interpretation.
A. Statutory Interpretation
CERCLA Section 107(a)(4)(B) governs the recovery of "any
other necessary costs of response" that many plaintiffs argue include
medical monitoring expenses. Therefore, courts confronted with
claims to recover medical monitoring costs usually begin their analyses by interpreting the language of this section. The courts agree on
only one issue related to the interpretation-that the language of
CERCLA, particularly this section, is ambiguous.22
21. Id. at 1535.
22. Section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA reads as follows:
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from

which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
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Both courts and scholars employ several competing theories in
attempts
to interpret statutes. These theories divide into two
their
categories, foundationalist and static theories, which consider the text
a non-changing document, and dynamic theories, which assume the
statutory text evolves over time.2 3 Various approaches to statutory
interpretation exist within each of these branches. 24 This Recent
Development examines how the courts' differing interpretations of the
statute affect the recoverability of medical monitoring costs.
1. Foundationalist Theories
Foundationalist theories, including textualism, purposivism,
and intentionalism (originalism), 25 differ in their approach to statutory
interpretation and the sources they examine in the process; however,
they all strive to find an objective standard to interpret the statute
accurately and to minimize the discretion of judicial interpreters. 28 To
achieve this aim, they seek to minimize nontextual sources of author27
ity from judicial consideration.
a. Textualism
The language used by Congress is the starting point for
interpreting statutes. 28 Textualists assert that, in most cases, statu-

(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4)(B).
23. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,87 Mich. L. Rev. 20, 21
(1988) (describing dynamic theories: "Congress builds a ship and charts its initial course, but the
ship's ports-of.call, safe harbors and ultimate destination may be a product of the ship's captain,
the weather, and other factors not identified at the time the ship sets sail. This model
understands a statute as an on-going process (a voyage) in which both the shipbuilder and
subsequent navigators play a role."). See also Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in
Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1073, 1082-83 (1992). Using
Aleinikoffs analogy, foundationalist theories, on the other hand, would consider the ship's
destination a product of the enacting Congress's actions, rather than factors arising during the
voyage.
24. This Recent Development does not attempt to analyze all the competing methods of
statutory interpretation.
25. For a more thorough discussion of each of these methods of statutory interpretation, see
William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning,
42 Stan. L. Rev. 321 (1900).
26. Id. at 325.
27. Zeppos, 70 Tex. L. Rev. at 1074 (cited in note 23).
28. CBS, Inc. v. FCC,453 U.S. 367,377 (1981).
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tory interpretation also ends upon ascertaining the apparent meaning
of the statutory language. 29 Although traditional textualists assert
that the plain meaning3o of a statute governs its interpretation unless
negated by strongly contradictory legislative history,3 1 new textualists32 assert that legislative history, in all but the most extreme cases,
is a forbidden tool. s3 New textualists, like Justice Antonin Scalia and
Judge Frank Easterbrook, believe legislative history is irrelevant.34
Despite the differing approaches, all textualists have the same
goals. Textualists argue that a pure textual interpretation enables
citizens to predict their rights and duties under the law and prevents
judicial lawmaking. 35 Moreover, they argue that nothing indicates the
statute's meaning more than the words enacted into law;36 therefore,
those words must comprise the law. 37 Critics argue that language is
susceptible to various interpretations and that it would be impossible
to interpret a statute properly without considering the context in
which Congress enacted it.38

29. See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 340 n.71 (cited in note 25).
30. Proponents of the 'plain meaning rule' argue that only the plain, or ordinary, meaning
of the words in the text should be used to interpret the statute. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 U.C.L.. L. Rev. 621, 623 (1990).
31.
Id. at 624.
32. Scholar William Eskridge has labeled Justice Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation the "new textualism.' Other judges, like Frank Easterbrook, also employ this method on
the bench. See id. at 623 n.l1 and accompanying text.
33. See Zeppos, 70 Tex. L. Rev. at 1084 (cited in note 23). See also Eskridge, 37 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. at 623-25 (cited in note 30).
34. Justice Scalia has set forth his textualist views from the bench on numerous occasions.
See, for example, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating, 'Although it is true that the Court in recent times has expressed approval of this
doctrine [that legislative history can sometimes trump plain meaning], that is to my mind an ill.
advised deviation from the venerable principle that if the language of a statute is clear, that
language must be given effect-at least in the absence of a patent absurdity.'); West Va. Univ.
Hoops., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (1991) (Scalia, J.); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v.
Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476,2490 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Judge Easterbrook also has set forth his textualist views. See, for example, In re Sinclair,870
F.2d 1340, 1342-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original
Intent in Statutory Construction,11 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 59, 60 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Statutes'Domains,50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 (1983) (suggesting that 'unless the statute plainly
hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law, the domain of the statute
should be restricted to cases anticipated by its framers and expressly resolved in the legislative
process'). See also Zeppos, 70 Tex. L. Rev. at 1080 n.36 (cited in note 23).
35, Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 340-41 (cited in note 25).
36. Id.
37. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917).
38.
Henry Hart aid Albert Sacks of the Harvard Law School posit that words have many
meanings and that meaning depends on context. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks,
The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1144-47 (Cambridge,
1958). See also Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 340-43 (cited in note 25).
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b. Intentionalismand Purposivism
Intentionalism and Purposivism exist in various forms. Intentionalism seeks to discover and apply the legislators' original intent as
the touchstone for statutory interpretation. 9 Intentionalists recognize
that Congress leaves some questions unresolved but allow the judici4
ary to fill the gaps by executing Congress's desires faithfully. 0
Because courts strive to effectuate the lawmakers' intentions,
proponents of intentionalism consider it the only legitimate theory of
41
statutory interpretation.
Purposivism is similar to intentionalism. This approach attempts to identify the legislature's purpose in adopting the law and to
interpret the statute consistently with that purpose. 42 This theory is
founded on the assumption that Congress developed every statute
with a specific purpose or objective in mind.
Critics argue, however, that both purposivism and intentionalism rely on the false assumption that the legislative purpose and
intent of a statute are discernible. 43 In addition, they argue that legislative history is indeterminate and imprecise and suggest that attributing statements of committee members and bill sponsors to the entire body of the bill produces faulty conclusions and, therefore, inaccurate statutory interpretation. 44 Critics suggest that this process results in judicial lawmaking. 45
2. Dynamic Theories: Practical Reasoning and Public Values
Some scholars believe that textualism, purposivism, and intentionalism require excessive judicial restraint that prevents adhering
scholars from interpreting statutes objectively and definitively."
These scholars, called dynamic theorists, urge the judiciary to take an
39.
40.

Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 325-26 (cited in note 25).
Richard A. Posner adopts a form of this approach. Critics often label Posner's approach

"imaginative reconstruction." See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform
286-87 (Harvard U., 1985) (stating that "the judge should try to put himself in the shoes of the
enacting legislators and figure out how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case
before him"). See also Zeppos, 70 Tex. L. Rev. at 1080 (cited in note 23).
41. Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 326 (cited in note 25).
42. Id. at 332-33.
43. An economic theory of legislation would posit that a statute, although the work of reasonable legislators, often has no "purpose" other than distributing benefits to the interest group
that purchased the statute. William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Cases and Materials
on Legislation, Statutes and the Creationof PublicPolicy 595 (West, 1988).
44. Id. at 571-72. 'See also Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 326-29 (cited in note
25).
45. Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 335.
46. See id. at 345.

1994]

MEDICAL MONITORING EXPENSES

243

active policy-making role47 and reach results based on what society
considers important today, as opposed to merely enforcing ancient
statutory ideals.48 Dynamic theorists urge courts to consider public
values and practical considerations when interpreting statutes; therefore, they encourage judges to consult a broader range of sources when
making their determinations.49
Practical reasoning and public values, two dynamic theories of
statutory interpretation, are closely related. Public values theorists
envision the judiciary making the government more responsive to
5 Equally result-oriented,
societal needs.W
practical reasoning theorists
emphasize the workability or value of a particular result and seek an
interpretation of the statute that will produce the most desirable
consequences.51 The practical reasoning approach accepts that the
interpretive process is creative and acknowledges outside influences in
the effort to interpret statutes reasonably.52 Accordingly, the theorists
consider a variety of factors including, but not limited to: statutory
language, Congress's original expectations, fairness, related statutory
policies, and constitutional values. Dynamic theorists argue that the
Supreme Court currently interprets statutes in this fashion."
B. The Brewer Courts
The court in Brewer v. Ravan55 first addressed the issue of
medical monitoring costs in more than a cursory manner.5
In
Brewer, former employees of a capacitor manufacturing plant located
in Waynesboro, Tennessee, and their families, brought a claim that
included, but was not limited to, recovery of necessary response costs
as a result of the release of polychlorobenzenes (PCBs) and other
hazardous substances from the Waynesboro plant.' The plaintiffs

47. Zeppos, 70 Tex. L. Rev. at 1082-83 (cited in note 23).
48. Cass Sunstein rejects originalism and argues that courts should implement background
norms as they relate to important public values. Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution:
Reconceiving the Regulatory State 157-59 (Harvard U., 1990). See also Zeppos, 70 Tex. L. Rev. at
1080 n.35 and accompanying text (cited in note 23).
49. Zeppos, 70 Tex. L. Rev. at 1082-83.
50. Id. at 1083.
51. Id. See also Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 270 (Harvard U., 1990);
Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 322 (cited in note 25).
52. Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 345-60.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
56. Tanenbaum, Comment, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 938-39 (cited in note 10).
57. Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1178-79.
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alleged that the "necessary response costs" under Section 107(a)(4)(B)
included medical monitoring expenses.8
Unlike the majority of courts, the Brewer court suggested that
"necessary costs of response" include medical monitoring costs. The
Brewer court upheld the claim against a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.59
The court's treatment of the three pertinent factors-purpose, characterization of medical monitoring costs, and statutory language-led to
its holding. Other courts that have reached the same result as
Brewer6 ° appear to follow its reasoning wholeheartedly.
1. CERCLA's Primary Purpose
The Brewer court began its opinion by stating CERCLA's primary purpose: to promote prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites by
requiring the responsible parties to pay for the remediation. 61 The
court did not explain how it determined CERCLA's purpose, nor did it
recognize the protection of public health 62 or deterence63 as purposes of
the statute; the court did not attempt to paint a broad public health
picture of CERCLA and did not acknowledge CERCLA's deterrent
purpose. Rather, the court merely stated the purpose and asserted
that this purpose, in conjunction with the statutory language,
demonstrated that Section 107(a)(1-4)(B) creates a private cause of
action for the "necessary costs of response" against the responsible
64
parties.
Although the court, in its opinion, did not rely explicitly on
CERCLA's purpose as the basis for its conclusions, its belief that
CERCLA strives to hold parties accountable for their damage pervades its statutory analysis. Accordingly, the court found that the
statute's purpose, in conjunction with the private right of recovery

58. Id. at 1178.
59. Id. at 1179-80. The parties apparently settled the case before they instituted the
monitoring program, so its details are unknown. It is likely that the program would have
included physical examinations and tests for genetic and cellular damage.
For a case in which a court approved similar medical monitoring programs under common-law
toxic tort principles, see Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847, 852 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
60. Lykins v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 27 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1590 (E.D. Ky. 1988), and
Williams v. Allied Automotive, 28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1223 (N.D. Ohio 1988), have followed the
Brewer rationale.
61. Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1178 (quoting Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318
(6th Cir. 1985)).
62. See generally Tannanbaum, Comment, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 925 (cited in note 10)
(proposing that CERCLA seeks to protect the public health and, therefore, "necessary costs of
response" inevitably include medical monitoring expenses).
63. The court simply cited the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Walls, 761 F.2d at 318.
64. Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1178.
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created by Section 107, establishes a right to medical monitoring costs
as necessary costs of response.
2. The Characterization of Medical Monitoring Costs
The Brewer court 65 continued its analysis by distinguishing
medical monitoring costs from medical expenses incurred in the
treatment of personal injuries or diseases caused by an unlawful release or discharge of hazardous substances.6
Recognizing that
CERCLA's legislative history clearly indicates that medical expenses
incurred in the treatment of personal injuries or disease caused by an
unlawful release or discharge of hazardous substances are not recoverable,6' 7 the court distinguished the plaintiffs' medical monitoring
claim 68 because the plaintiffs sought to recover the cost of medical
testing and screening conducted "to assess the effect of the release or
discharge on public health or to identify potential health problems
presented by the release"; their claim, unlike claims for medical expenses, was cognizable under Section 107(a).61

The Brewer court's ability to distinguish medical monitoring
expenses from personal injury claims was indispensable to its holding
because plaintiffs cannot recover for personal injuries under CERCLA.
Although distinguishing personal injury claims from monitoring
claims eased the Brewer court's challenge to finding medical
monitoring costs "a necessary cost of response," the court's mode of
statutory interpretation ultimately enabled it to conclude that medical
monitoring costs are a "necessary cost of response."
65.
Those who adopt its mode of analysis naturally proceed along the same line. In fact,
many courts merely state that they are adopting the Brewer analysis without further examination. See note 60 for a list of cases. To minimize confusion, this analysis continually will refer to
the Brewer court, but the reader should note that it similarly applies to these other cases.
66. Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179.
67. Id. See also Chaplin v. Exxon Corp., 25 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 2009, 2011-12 (S.D. Tex.
1986) (discussing CERCLA's legislative history concerning this issue); Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't
of New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348, 1356 n.10 (D. Del. 1985).
The Brewer court
acknowledged that costs of testing, monitoring, and investigating the actual site generally are recoverable. This type of soil and groundwater monitoring is very different than the medical
monitoring that is at issue.
68. Brewer, 680 F. Supp at 1179.
69. Id. The Brewercourt cites Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429-30 (S.D. Ohio
1984) (emphasis in original), for this proposition; however, the heavy reliance on Jones by courts
that award medical monitoring costs seems misplaced. The plaintiffs in Jones sought costs for
medical testing and the loss of the use of their wells for drinking water and farming purposes.
The Jones court only stated that 'the statutory definitions of removal and remedial actions are
broadly drawn and appear to cover at least some of the elements of damages claimed by these
plaintiffs.' Id. at 1430 (emphasis added). Although this statement does not exclude the recovery
of medical testing expenses, it does not state that medical monitoring costs are necessarily part of
the 'some" elements of damages that are covered.
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3. The Brewer Court's Approach to Statutory Interpretation
The Brewer court, like other courts, struggled to apply Section
107(a) because of its ambiguous language. CERCLA does not define
the phrase "necessary costs of response" and only defines "response' in
the most indirect and ambiguous manner.70 The Brewer court appropriately began its analysis with the statute's language, but found that
it provided little guidance. The court considered the text ambiguous
and noted that it lacked a definition for the phrase "necessary costs of
response." Acknowledging that the plain language of CERCLA provided it little guidance, the court looked to the legislative history-a
primary tool in interpreting statutes for intentionalists and purposivists. The court stated that the legislative history clearly indicated that plaintiffs may not recover personal medical expenses
caused by an unlawful hazardous waste release under Section
9607(a).7 1 Without further explanation, however, the court stated that
to the extent the plaintiffs sought to recover costs for medical monitoring conducted "to assess the effect of the release or discharge on public
health or to identify potentialpublic health problems presented by the
72
release," they presented a cognizable claim under Section 9607(a).
The court therefore implicitly assumed that a claim for medical
monitoring costs is not a claim for personal medical expenses.
The Brewer court next considered CERCLA's definitions of
"response" and "remove." Section 101(25) defines "response" to mean
"remove or removal," "remedy," and "remedial action." 7 The court
explained further that "remove" and "removal" costs include those
costs necessary to "monitor, assess, or evaluate a release."74 The
Brewer court, without examining the definitions' context or the
context of the remainder of the statute, stated that because public
health-related medical tests and screening are necessary to "monitor,
75
assess, or evaluate a release," CERCLA allows for their recovery.
For example, the court ignored Congress's specific examples of what it
meant by removal actions, which directly follow the definition of
"removal." These examples include: security fencing, alternative
water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing, and other

70. Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179 (quoting Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1429-30).
71.
Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179 (citing Chaplin, 25 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) at 2011-12, and
Artesian Water Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1356 n.10).
72. Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179 (citing Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1429-30) (emphasis in

original).
73.
74.
75.

42 U.S.C § 9601(25).
Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179 (citing 42 U.S.c. § 9601(23)).
Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179.
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emergency assistance. 76 These actions all contemplate immediate
responses to problems caused by exposure to hazardous wastes and,
therefore, are entirely different from medical monitoring expenses.
Courts should employ a combination of several theories of
statutory interpretation. The Brewer court interpreted the statute in
two steps: First, the court established that Section 107(a)(1-4)(B)
creates a private cause of action against responsible parties for the
recovery of "necessary costs of response." Second, the court concluded
that the private right of recovery included medical testing and
screening costs.
The court employed different methods of
interpretation to clear each of these hurdles.
To establish that Section 107(a) creates a private cause of action, the court employed a purely purposivist approach. After asserting CERCLA's purpose, the court reasoned from the purpose that
Section 107(a) creates a private cause of action for necessary response
costs. The court did not engage in a textual analysis but did mention
that the purpose and language agreed. Several presuppositions underlie this traditional purposivist approach. It assumes that statutes
have a discernible and laudable purpose. Moreover, it assumes that
because statutes are good things, judges read them broadly. Critics,
specifically public choice theorists, would argue that CERCLA is
special interest legislation that reflects the outcome of a battle between environmentalists and corporate entities. Although Section 107
clearly creates a private cause of action for "necessary cost(s) of response," critics would argue that a judge sensitive to special interest
group politics would have scrutinized the statute more closely, being
careful not to give either side more than it acquired in the bargaining
process.
Moreover, the court's opinion suffers from its failure to acknowledge, much less justify, CERCLA's purpose of deterring hazardous waste releases by holding responsible parties strictly liable.
By asserting the "facilitation of cleanup purpose" and ignoring the
"deterrence purpose," some would argue that the court engaged in
judicial lawmaking." The peril of asserting only one purpose is that
there can be too much of a good thing-Congress may have intended
to facilitate cleanup by making responsible parties pay, but not to the
extent that private parties should pay medical treatment costs.

76. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
77. See Eskridge ind Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 336.37 (cited in note 25) (criticizing the
result in the Title VII Supreme Court case United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), in
which the Court asserted the 'results purpose" of Title VII and neglected the 'color-blindness
purpose").
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The court did not engage in a textual analysis but acknowledged that the text and the statute's purpose both supported the
interpretation that Section 107 establishes a private cause of action.
Although the well-settled starting point for statutory interpretation is
the text, the Brewer court appears to have shirked that duty. Textual
analysis is virtually inconsequential to this part of the court's
analysis, however, because examining both CERCLA and judicial
opinions makes it clear that Section 107 creates a private cause of
action.
The second part of the court's analysis is much more controversial for two reasons. First, this portion of the opinion concludes that
medical monitoring costs are necessary costs of response per se, and
the court engages in a less traditional mode of statutory
interpretation. The Brewer court failed to perform a thorough textual
analysis. It looked to the definitions of remove and removal, but did
not look beyond the definitions to the specific examples of each that
Congress provided. The court next turned to the legislative history. It
noted the clear indication in the legislative history that plaintiffs may
not recover medical expenses incurred in the treatment of personal
injury or disease. From Congress's failure to exclude medical monitoring costs specifically, the court reasoned these expenses were included
necessarily.78
Second, the court deviated even further from traditional
statutory analysis and made value judgments as to the necessity of
medical monitoring to effectuate a cleanup. By incorporating current
values and its knowledge of the cleanup process, the court adopted a
dynamic approach to statutory interpretation. This court concluded
that CERCLA's definition of response costs includes medical tests
related to the public's health because they are "necessary to monitor,
assess, or evaluate a release.7M As evidenced by the Coburn8° line of
cases, other courts have reached the opposite conclusion-that medical
monitoring is not absolutely necessary to monitor or assess a release,
and therefore, medical monitoring costs are not recoverable.
It is apparent that the Brewer court employed several theories
of statutory interpretation. The court relied on CERCLA's text, Congressional purpose, the legislative history, and also on its own policy
decisions and value judgments as to what it deemed necessary to
monitor and evaluate a release. This notion that the court employed
an eclectic approach is not original. In fact, one scholar has argued
78.

Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179.

79.
80.

Id.
Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1665 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
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that the Supreme Court's approach to statutory interpretation is an
eclectic one, employing sources from originalist, textual, and dynamic
theories.81
This Recent Development does not advocate the Brewer court's
method of statutory interpretation. A thorough examination of the
statutory text, which would have included studying the examples of
remove and removal that Congress provided as well as how the
statutory provision cohered with the remainder of the statute, 2 should
precede any indulgence into legislative history and public values. In
the instant case, if the court had looked beyond the definitions of the
terms to the specific examples of what Congress meant by remove and
removal, it would have seen that Congress contemplated physical
means of stopping the migration of hazardous substances or
alternatively emergency evacuation procedures in the event the
physical means of stopping the migration of the hazardous substances
were not enacted in a timely manner. Moreover, in the absence of
other evidence supporting the recovery of medical monitoring costs,
the court's implicit assumption that Congress's failure to exclude
medical monitoring costs implies that they are recoverable is contrary
to what most scholars would consider sound statutory interpretation, sa
especially in light of the hurried manner in which CERCLA was
passed. Few things are settled in the legislative history, making it
even more unlikely that some specific item's absence from the
legislative history reflects Congressional intent to cover it.
Indeed, some scholars argue that cases anticipated by the statute's framers and expressly resolved in the legislative process should
limit the statute's domain; other matters should be outside the
statute's scope, governed instead by common law.84 In the instant
case, toxic tort law could provide petitioners with a means to recover
medical monitoring expenses. 85 Although some scholars would support
the Brewer court's judicial gap-filling, they also would have sought
guidance from other extrinsic sources or attempted to achieve the
legislature's vision of the statute's application.8 They would not have
assumed blindly that Congress's failure to prohibit the recovery of
81. Zeppos, 70 Tex. L. Rev. at 1120 (cited in note 23).
82. See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 355 (cited in note 25) (stating that textual
analysis should consider how the provision works with the general structure of the statute
because other provisions might shed light on the one being interpreted).
83. See, for example, Easterbrook, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 544-52 (cited in note 34) (stating
that the domain of the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by its framers).

84.

Id.

85. See Part HiLE. of this Recent Development, which discusses the relationship between
toxic tort law and the recoverability of medical monitoring costs.
86. Posner, The Federal Courts at 286-93 (cited in note 40).
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medical monitoring costs automatically allows for their inclusion. A
thorough analysis of the legislative history, Congressional purpose
and intent, and current values, would have informed the Brewer court
that "necessary costs of response" do not include medical monitoring
costs under CERCLA as currently written. Unfortunately, although
the Brewer court's result is laudable, its flawed statutory analysis
undermines its precendential value, and as evidenced by the Coburn
line of cases, plaintiffs cannot rely on Brewer to recover medical
monitoring expenses.
Consequently, this Recent Development
advocates a statutory amendment to ensure plaintiffs that medical
monitoring costs will be included as "necessary costs of response."
C. The Coburn Line of Cases
In contrast to Brewer, the opposing line of cases refuses to
grant medical monitoring costs as a "necessary cost of response" under
Section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA. The result in Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corporations'supports the proposition that costs for future medical
monitoring are not "necessary costs of response." In Coburn, the
plaintiffs, residents of Dublin, Pennsylvania, had been exposed to
well-water contaminated with hazardous chemicals released from the
defendant's property.8 The plaintiffs' claims included recovery of
future medical screening costs under Section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA.
1. CERCLA's Primary Purpose
The Coburn court acknowledged only one purpose of
CERCLA-to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites
by placing the ultimate financial burden on the parties responsible for
the environmental release89-and accordingly, refused to award
medical monitoring expenses.9 0 If the court had conceded that
CERCLA has a public health purpose, it may have invited claims that
CERCLA allows the recovery of medical monitoring costs because
monitoring is necessary to protect the public health. Similarly,
admitting a deterrence purpose may have welcomed arguments that
CERCLA's deterrence purpose cannot be fulfilled without requiring
responsible parties to pay all the costs of the harm they caused. The
court's failure to acknowledge these other purposes lessens the value
87.
1988).
88.
89.
90.

19 Envir. L. Rptr. (ETA) 20256 (E.D. Pa. 1988); 28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1665 (E.D. Pa.
Coburn, 28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) at 1666.
Id. at 1667 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986)).
Coburn, 28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) at 1670.
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of its opinion. If the court had recognized the additional purposes
behind the enactment of CERCLA, but emphasized that Congress
intentionally decided that these purposes should yield to the extent
they provide for recovery of personal medical treatment costs, its
opinion would have been strengthened.
2. The Crucial Distinction
The courts that grant medical monitoring costs necessarily
distinguish them from personal injury claims. 91 The courts that deny
claims for medical monitoring costs are subtle about the distinction,
and although most courts do not equate the claims, they draw very
cursory distinctions.92 Although equating the two would simplify
these courts' analyses because CERCLA specifically excludes personal
injury medical expenses, it would diminish the value of the court's
opinion significantly because the two claims are distinguishable: one
serves the public health and the other compensates victims.93 Unlike
many courts that prohibit the recovery of medical monitoring expenses, the Coburn court appears to have recognized the distinction
between the two claims9 4 For example, it agreed with the Brewer
court's position that medical expenses incurred in the treatment of
personal injuries are not recoverable response costs under CERCLA.
The court disagreed, however, that medical expenses incurred as a
result of medical testing conducted to assess the effect of the release
on the public health constitute recoverable response costs.95
The Coburn court concluded that neither claim is recoverable.
The court, however, did not equate or distinguish explicitly the two
types of claims; it merely stated that CERCLA's phrase "necessary
costs of response" refers to costs required to stop physically the
migration of hazardous wastes, not to treat or evaluate their medical
effects. For additional support, the Coburn line of cases continually
refers to and relies on the deletion of medical expenses from CERCLA
and the Supreme Court's observation that Congress did not intend to
compensate private parties for damages resulting from hazardous
substance discharge.96 These cases therefore hold that CERCLA
91. See Brewer, 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
92. See Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1665 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
93, Medical monitoring serves the public health while recovery of medical expenses
incurred in the treatment of personal injuries compensates victims.
94. See Coburn,28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) at 1670.
95. Id. at 1670.71'(citing Chaplin v. Exxon Corp., 25 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 2009, 2012 (S.D.
Tex. 1986)).
96. See, for example, Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 64849 (3d Cir. 1988).
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excludes medical monitoring cost claims, as it does personal injury
claims. This line of cases would be more potent if the courts had
acknowledged that the two types of claims are distinguishable and
had justified the exclusion of medical monitoring expenses by
examining the statutory language and pieces of the legislative history
that refer to medical monitoring. The Coburn line of cases arrive at
the correct result; however, their analysis is far from flawless.
3. The Coburn Court's Mode of Statutory Interpretation
The Coburn court began its analysis with CERCLA's plain, yet
ambiguous, languageY The court first considered the definitions that
the statute provided.98 It then acknowledged the context of the
definitions of both "remove"99 and "remedy"1°° by noting the examples
the drafters gave to signify their intentions. As the court noted, the
statutory definitions of the words contain no reference to medical
expenses nor do the words imply that such costs are recoverable. 10'
Rather, the Coburn court concluded that the statute only
02
contemplates the cleanup of toxic substances from the environment.
In examining CERCLA as a whole, the Coburn court noted
that although the statute's text contains medical monitoring provisions, they are separate from the liability provisions of Section 107(a).
The court explained that Congress created the Agency for Toxic Substances and Diseases Registry in Section 104(i) of CERCLA to provide
medical care and testing to exposed individuals. Thus, the Coburn
court concluded that Congress explicitly provided for the recovery of
medical monitoring costs when it wished to do so.0 3 Using its in-depth
textual analysis, the Coburn court presumed that Congress did not
intend to include medical monitoring costs as "necessary costs of
response," but it sought additional support for this conclusion in the
legislative history.
The court recognized that the legislative history would provide
little insight into the statute's meaning due to the unique circum-

97. It is well settled that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the statute itself.
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. ChesapeakeBay Foundation,484 U.S. 49,56 (1987).
98. Coburn, 28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) at 1667.
99. Id. The specific examples of 'remove* include security fencing, alternative water
supplies, and evacuation and other emergency assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
100. The specific examples of 'remedy" include containment actions, treatment or incineration, provision of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring necessary to assure that the
actions taken protect th public health. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
101. Coburn, 28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) at 1670.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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stances of CERCLA's enactment. 1°4 The court quoted the Third Circuit in Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County,1°5 which stated that
"[the] circuitous language of CERCLA reflects the statute's checkered
legislative formulation." i ° s In its examination of the legislative
history, the Coburn court emphasized the compromises that went into
the enactment of CERCLA. 10 7 Relying on Senator Randolph's
comment that in the final compromise bill Congress had deleted the
federal cause of action for medical expenses or property or income loss,
the Coburn court concluded that the final bill specifically excluded the
medical monitoring costs. °8
The Coburn court then considered other judicial opinions that
addressed the recovery of medical monitoring costs, and noted its
support for those that refused to allow recovery. The court cited
° and Wehner v. Syntex Corporation,11°
Chaplin v. Exxon Corporationo
two cases that prohibited recovery. In Chaplin, the court, after
examining CERCLA's legislative history, concluded that Congress
intentionally deleted the federal cause of action for medical expenses
from CERCLA and that medical testing costs differed from both the
response costs and cleanup costs that were recoverable under Section
9607.111 The Coburn court also cited the Wehner court's opinion, which
similarly concluded that although Congress contemplated including
medical monitoring costs under "necessary response costs," it excluded
them in the final bill. The Coburn court felt that because Congress
obviously considered allowing recovery of medical monitoring costs,

104. Id. at 1667.
105. 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
106. Id. at 648. The court continued:
After a number of predecessor bills failed to muster sufficient support, a group of senators
submitted the Stafford-Randolph compromise bill to a lame duck Congress in the waning
days of the Carter Administration. That bill, however, did not receive careful study by a
committee, and voting on the floor was controlled by a procedure that permitted no
amendments, other than one previously cleared. The legislative history, therefore, fur.
nishes at best a sparse and unreliable guide to the statute's meaning.
Id. The bizarre manner in which the Senators essentially snuck CERCLA by Congress is no
secret-lengthy articles have been written on the process of CERCLA's enactment. See, for
example, Grad, 8 Colum. J. Envir. L. 1 (cited in note 4).
107. See notes 172 and 175 accompanying the Legislative History discussion in Part III,
which discuss the compromises reached during the passing of CERCLA. In the original Senate
Superfund Bill, Congress contemplated including medical monitoring, but the Act, as passed, did
not contain any language reflecting Congress's desire to include medical monitoring as a
'necessary cost of response.' Coburn,28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) at 1668.
108. Coburn,28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) at 1670.
109. 25 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 2009 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
110. 681 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
111. Coburn, 28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) at 1668 (citing Chaplin,25 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) at 2012).
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the decision not to provide for their recovery explicitly in CERCLA
indicated Congressional intent not to grant this relief.112
The Coburn court's heavy reliance on the legislative history is
surprising because it previously had noted that the bizarre manner in
which this bill was passed delegitimized the legislative history. The
court indicated that the voting parties were not given the opportunity
to amend or delete provisions of the bill, or even to study its provisions. Nevertheless, the Coburn court ultimately concluded that the
absence of any provision for medical monitoring costs indicates that
Congress intentionally eliminated them.
The Coburn court then confronted decisions that permitted
claims for medical monitoring costs to proceed past the summary
judgment stage. It noted that in Jones v. Inmont Corporation,113 the
court relied on the broad definitions of "removal" and "remedial" to
allow the claim to proceed past the summary judgment stage; it never
actually interpreted the phrase "necessary costs of response."114 The
Coburncourt found the Jones decision unpersuasive because it merely
relied on the broad definitions of "removal" and "remedial" without
actually addressing the issue of whether medical monitoring costs are
"necessary costs of response." 115
In addition, the Coburn court analyzed the district court's
reasoning in Brewer. The Coburn court correctly stated that the
Brewer court had based its conclusion on the rationale that "public
health related medical tests and screening clearly are necessary to
'monitor, assess, [or] evaluate a release' and, therefore, constitute
'removal' under Section 9601(23)."116 Because "response" is defined in
part as "remove," the Brewer court concluded that costs incurred as a
result of such tests and screening are recoverable. The Coburn court
recognized that the Brewer court's line of reasoning necessarily
distinguished medical expenses incurred in the treatment of personal
injuries or disease from those incurred as a result of medical
monitoring. Although the Coburn court never stated that it saw no
distinction between medical expenses incurred in the treatment of
personal injuries and those incurred from medical monitoring to protect the public health, it did conclude that the Brewer court's
determination that. medical monitoring costs were necessary to
"monitor, assess, or evaluate a release" contravened the plain

112. Coburn,28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) at 1670.
113. 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
114. Coburn, 28 Envir. Rptr.(BNA) at1669.
115. Id. at 1670.
116. Id. at 1669 (quoting Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179).
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meaning of the statute. 7 The court stated: "Quite simply, we find it
difficult to understand how future medical testing and monitoring of
persons who were exposed to contaminated well water prior to the
remedial measures currently underway will do anything to 'monitor,
assess, [or] evaluate a release' of contamination from the site."118 On
these grounds the Coburn court found Brewer unpersuasive and
elected not to follow its rationale. Although the Coburn court correctly
determined that medical monitoring costs are not "necessary costs of
response," the court's blanket conclusion that medical monitoring
could be of no assistance to evaluate a release is erroneous. Medical
monitoring may illuminate the contaminants to which persons have
been exposed, at what level, and possibly through what median,
enabling more effective remedial measures in the future.
Additionally, another aspect of the court's line of reasoning
may be flawed. Coburn relied on the exclusion of medical expenses
from the final bill to infer the exclusion of medical monitoring costs.
Are medical monitoring costs equivalent to medical expenses? An
affirmative answer likely would preclude the recovery of medical
monitoring costs because Congress clearly deleted medical expenses
from the final bill. Alternatively, if medical monitoring is a public
health-related screening process necessary to detect the effects of
hazardous chemical exposure on the human body, and if medical
expenses are distinguishable, then it is not clear that Congress
necessarily excluded medical monitoring claims along with claims for
medical expenses.
The Coburn court engaged in a more thorough examination of
CERCLA than did the Brewer court; however, its mode of statutory
interpretation seems equally eclectic. The court appears to have
analyzed CERCLA from a textualist's perspective. It engaged in a
thorough analysis of Section 107(a)(4)(B) and its surrounding
language, but because of the statute's ambiguity, resorted to the
legislative history to support its presumption against recovery of
medical monitoring expenses. It is arguable whether a textualist
would have examined the legislative history. Certainly a new
textualist like Justice Scalia would have ended the analysis after
concluding that the examples of removal that Congress contemplated
are all physical means of stopping contaminants from spreading, as
opposed to screening procedures. The Coburn court discounted the
value-of CERCLA's legislative history yet proceeded to examine it, and

117. Coburn, 28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) at 1671.
118. Id.
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actually relied on the legislative history for the basis of its opinion.
Under the guise of a textual analysis, the court then stated that
finding medical monitoring costs recoverable contravenes the plain
meaning of the statute. The court appears to have made a value
judgment that medical monitoring costs are not necessary and
couched it in a textual analysis to reduce the criticism of its opinion.
As evidenced by the Brewer and Coburn decisions, the district
courts are split as to whether medical monitoring costs are "necessary
response costs." These conflicting approaches precipitated the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Daigle v. Shell Oil Co.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT: DAGLE V. SHELL OIL CO.119
In 1956, the Army constructed and began using Basin F, a
ninety-three acre hazardous waste impoundment on the Rocky Mountain Arsenal ('the Arsenal"), near Commerce City, Colorado. 20 The
Army operated the Arsenal, using Basin F for the impoundment of
hazardous waste generated from its chemical product, chemical warfare agent, and incendiary munition manufacturing activities. 12 Under a lease agreement from the Army, Shell Oil Company also used
Basin F to impound hazardous waste generated in its pesticide and
herbicide manufacturing activities on the Arsenal. 12 2 The combined
activities of Shell and the Army left the Arsenal one of the worst
hazardous waste pollution sites in the United States,23. and Basin F
represents only a small portion of a much bigger problem.124 Army
officials estimate that the twenty-seven square mile Arsenal has 120
contamination sites that contain enormous quantities of solid and
liquid wastes. Some of that waste is unique because of the mixture of
private herbicide and pesticide manufacturing activities with Army
munitions manufacturing activities. 12 5 In 1984, with guidance from
the EPA, the Army began a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility

119. 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992).
120. Id. at 1531.
121. Id.
122. Id.

123. Id.
124. Id. The entire Arsenal currently is ranked as the number two priority on the National
Priorities List (NPL), an EPA-compiled list that prioritizes CERCLA sites for cleanup based on
the relative risk or daniger to public health or welfare or the environment. See 42 U.S.C. S
9605(a)(8). The list is published at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 app. B (1991).
.125. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1531 (citing the declaration of Donald L. Campbell, Deputy Program
Manager, Army Program Manager's Office).
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Study (RI/FS)128 pursuant to CERCLA.12 7 Through this arduous and
complex process, the Army identified fourteen specific sites that
needed Interim Response Actions (IRAs) to protect human health and
the environment.2 8 TheArmy included Basin F on this list of fourteen
sites.12
The IRA finally began in April 1988, many years after hazardous wastes began leaking into the surrounding environment from
Basin F.1 30 In agreement with the EPA and the State of Colorado, the
year,
Army and Shell jointly initiated the IRA. The IRA lasted for one
3
1
pile.1
waste
solid
the
of
capping
the
with
ending in March 1989
In Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., the plaintiffs sued for alleged injuries
resulting from the cleanup effort itself. The containment effort had
stirred noxious odors and airborne pollutants that blew over the plaintiffs' 32 residences, most of which were located in a trailer park oneand-a-half miles due west of Basin F.13 3 Although some plaintiffs
registered complaints about the odors by December 1988, before the
IRA was completed, the government decided that the long-term benefits of removing the hazardous waste outweighed the intermittent
discomfort caused by the odors.134 The plaintiffs alleged that this
"intermittent discomfort" caused property and economic damage and a
variety of ailments, ranging from conjunctivitis to skin rashes, including the possibility of latent disease. 8 5
The plaintiffs asked the Colorado District Court to establish a
fund to finance long-term "medical monitoring" to detect the onset of

126. The purpose of an RI/FS is to identify contamination sites and determine the feasibility
of proposed responses.
127. Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Studies are taken pursuant to CERCLA § 104,
42 U.S.C. § 9604, which authorizes the President to respond to threatened or actual hazardous

waste releases. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). The Army took actions at Basin F, under the supervision of the EPA and in joint agreement with Shell, in accordance with this overall grant of
authority. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2,923 (1987) (delegating CERCLA response
authority to the EPA, and for military institutions such as the Arsenal, to the Secretary of

Defense).
128. See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1532. Interim Response Actions are to take place before the
implementation of a permanent remedial response. Id. These actions temporarily stop the
immediate spreading of contaminants.

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. The plan involved "the government contract[ing] Ebasco Constructors, Inc., a
private contractor, to transfer the liquid hazardous waste from Basin F to on-site storage tanks

and lined surface impoundments, move contaminated solids into a lined and capped waste pile,
and place a clay cap, top soil, and vegetation over soils remaining within the Basin." Id.
132. The plaintiffs are a group of individuals who reside near the Arsenal. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Donald L. Campbell, Deputy Program Manager, Army Program Manager's
Office, stating the Army's position).

135. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1532.
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any latent disease possibly caused by the Basin F cleanup.88 The
plaintiffs stated that the fund and the monitoring were necessary to
assist them in the prevention, early detection, and treatment of
chronic disease resulting from the exposure. 137 They argued that
Section 107(a) of CERCLA, which allows a private right of recovery for
"necessary response costs," should enable them to recover medical
monitoring expenses. Due to uncertainty resulting from the poorly
developed record and the complete lack of appellate guidance, the
District Court denied Shell's and the government's motions to dismiss
the CERCLA monitoring claims.'3 8 Shell and the Government
appealed, asserting that the term "response costs" under CERCLA
Section 107(a) does not encompass medical monitoring costs. 39
A. The Court's Brief Look at the Purpose of CERCLA
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis of the Daigle plaintiffs'
claims by looking at CERCLA's purpose, 140 as amended by the 1986
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). 4' The
Tenth Circuit recalled its decision in Colorado v. Idarado Mining
Company'4 to determine the purpose of CERCLA. In IdaradoMining,
the Tenth Circuit stated that Congress enacted CERCLA to expedite
the cleanup of environmental contamination caused by hazardous
waste releases. It noted that to further this purpose, the Act establishes several mechanisms to respond to actual or threatened releases
and delineates the respective powers and rights of governmental
entities and private parties. The Daigle court concluded that Congress designed Section 107(a) to fulfill the overall objective of shifting
liability for cleanup costs to responsible parties. 43 Specifically, Section
107 (a)(4)(B) states that responsible parties may be sued for "any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan." 44 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the defendants were the responsible parties and that
136. Id. at 1532-33.
137. Id. at 1533.
138. Id. at 1531.
139. Id.
140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
141. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). See Daigle,972 F.2d at 1533.
142. 916 F.2d 1486, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990).
143. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1533 (citing IdaradoMining Co., 916 F.2d at 1488).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). The part of the statement referring to 'any other person" is
based on the framework of Part A directly preceeding that provision, which states that the 'costs
of removal or remedial action" that can be recovered are those that were 'incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian Tribe . . . " (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(4)(A).
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the only issue was whether the plaintiffs' monitoring claim fell within
Section 107(a)(4)(B)'s private right of recovery for "any other necessary costs of response .... ,14
B. A Hard Look at the Text of CERCLA in the Context of the Whole
The Tenth Circuit sought to determine through a literal
interpretation of the text whether CERCLA provided for recovery of
medical monitoring costs. The Daigle court acknowledged the difficulty courts face in interpreting the language of CERCLA when it
stated: "In keeping with its notorious lack of clarity, CERCLA leads us
down a convoluted path to the definition of 'any other necessary costs
of response." ' 14 The court began its textual interpretation on the accurate premise that the drafters did not directly define the phrase "any
other necessary costs of response" as a whole, but rather defined only
the term "response."1 4 Having only the definition of "response" with
which to work, the court began its analysis there. It recognized that
"response" is defined as a "removal action" or a "remedial action."'4
The Daigle court concluded that "removal actions" are actions designed to effect an interim solution to a contamination problem.149
CERCLA defines "removal" as cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, which includes actions that
may be necessary to monitor and evaluate the release or threat of
release, and other actions that may be necessary to prevent, minimize,
or mitigate damage to the public health or the environment. The
Daigle court then took the next step, one that courts which refuse to
award medical monitoring expenses appear not to take; the court
looked at the context in which Congress defined "removal actions."
Congress provided specific examples of "remove" or "removal," which
include security fencing, provision of alternative water supplies,
temporary evacuation, and housing of threatened individuals.15 °
145. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1533. The court noted that "whether costs are consistent with the
national contingency plan" as required by the latter part of subsection (B) also was not at issue.
Id. at 1533 n.4. The National Contingency Plan (NCP) is a body of substantive and procedural
guidelines that governs CERCLA cleanup actions. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9605).
146. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1533.
147. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25)).
148. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1533.
149. Id. at 1533-34.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). In full, the text reads:
'[R]emove" or "removal" means the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances
from the environmeiit, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat
of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be
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The Tenth Circuit then examined the other definition of response, "remedial actions," and noted that it refers to a permanent
solution to a contamination problem.151 The court found that "remedy"
or "remedial action," as defined by CERCLA, means permanent
actions taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event
of a release or threat of a release that operate to prevent or minimize
the migration of the substances.152
Again, the Daigle court turned to the legislature's examples.
CERCLA states that remedial actions are actions taken at the location
of the release, including storage, confinement, and perimeter protection using dikes, trenches or ditches, clay cover, neutralization,
cleanup, and any monitoring required to assure that such actions
protect the public health and welfare and the environment.1 6
The Daigle court then critiqued the plaintiffs' and the defendants' arguments in light of its own thorough textual analysis. The
plaintiffs relied on the plain language in the definitions of "removal"
and "remedy" that refers to "monitoring" in the "public health and
welfare context"M to argue that CERCLA clearly covers the monitornecessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to
the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. The
term includes, in addition, without being limited to, security fencing or other measures to
limit access, provision of alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of
threatened individuals not otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604(b) of
this title, and any emergency assistance which may be provided under the Disaster Relief
Act of 1974. [42 U.S.C.A. § 5121 et seq.]
Id.
151. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1534.
152. Id.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). CERCLA's definition reads in full as follows:
Those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of hazardous substance into
the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they
do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or
the environment. The term includes, but is not limited to such actions at the location of
the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or
ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances, or contaminated materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes,
dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection of
leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the
public health and welfare and the environment ....
Id. The statute concludes by stating that the term "remedy" or "remedial action" means those actions consistent with permanent relocation of residents and businesses and community facilities
when the President determines that, alone or in combination with other measures, relocation is
more cost-effective than and environmentally preferable to the transportation, storage,
treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of hazardous substances, or may otherwise be
necessary to protect th&public health or welfare. The term includes offsite transport and offsite
storage treatment, destruction, or secure disposition of hazardous substances and associated
contaminated materials. Id.
154. See text accompanying notes 74-76.
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ing costs they sought and cited Brewer v. Raven' and several other
cases that arrived at the same result as Brewer.1 The Daigle court
then critiqued the Brewer court's holding and noted that the Brewer
court applied what it considered to be the plain language of the
definitions to hold that Section 9601 "removal" and "remedial" costs
encompass medical monitoring, provided the monitoring is "conducted
to assess the effect of the release or discharge on public health or to
157
identify potential public health problems presented by the release."
The Daigle court acknowledged that the statutory language indicates
that certain monitoring costs are recoverable as "removal action" or
"remedial action" response costs.08 The Tenth Circuit concluded,
however, that the plaintiffs and the Brewer court interpreted the
"public health and welfare" language in the definitions too broadly.19
It also noted that other district courts, 160 after examining the plain
language of the definitions in the context of CERCLA's overall
structure and history, similarly rejected the Brewer holding for its
overbreadth.161 The defendants relied on this reasoning in their
16 2
argument.
In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit proceeded to do what it
claimed the plaintiffs and the courts following the Brewer line of cases
had failed to do: it examined the "monitoring" and "health and
welfare" language in the context of the statute, concluding that both
definitions address containing and cleaning up hazardous substance
releases.'6 The Tenth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that

155. 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).

156. The plaintiffs also cited Williams v. Allied Automotive, 704 F. Supp 782, 784-85 (N.D.
Ohio 1988); Adams v. Republic Steel Corp., 621 F. Supp. 370, 376-77 (W.D. Tenn. 1988); Jones v.
Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429-30 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
157. Daigle,972 F.2d at 1534 (quoting Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179) (emphasis in original).

158. Daigle,972 F.2d at 1535.
159. Id.
160. The aforementioned district courts referred to the comprehensive analysis in Coburn v.
Sun Chemical Corp., 28 Envir. Rptr. (BNA) 1665 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (declining to award medical

monitoring costs). See Tanenbaum, Comment, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 925 (cited in note 10).
161. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535 (citing Woodman v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 1467, 1469-70
(M.D. Fla. 1991); Bolina v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 713-14 (D. Kan. 1991); Cook v.

Rockwell Intl Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1473-74 (D. Colo. 1991); Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F.
Supp. 1233, 1246-50 (M.D. Pa. 1990); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 901-05 (D. Minn.
1990).

162. Daigle,972 F.2d at 1535.
163. Id. The court noted as an example that the "monitorling]" allowed under the "removal
action" definition relates under the plain statutory language only to the evaluation of the extent

of a "release or threat of release of hazardous substances." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)). The
court similarly noted that the "remedial action' definition expressly focuses only on actions

necessary to "prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not
migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment." Daigle,972 F.2d at 1535 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24)).
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the additional language in Section 9601(23), which refers to "other
actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage
to the public health or welfare," deserves a broad reading to cover any
type of monitoring that Would mitigate health problems. 164 The circuit
court stated that even though medical monitoring would mitigate the
plaintiffs' potential individual health problems, the general provision
for prevention or mitigation of "damage to public health or welfare"
requires an interpretation consistent with the specific examples of
"removal costs" enumerated in the definition.165 The court also
explained that the specific examples all prevent or mitigate damage to
public health by preventing contact between the spreading contaminants and the public, 66 and that the sort of long-term health monitoring requested by the plaintiffs67 clearly could not further this aim
because the release would have already occurred prior to any monitor68
ing.1
C. CERCLA's CriticalCharacterizationand Ambiguous Legislative
History
After thoroughly analyzing the statutory text, the Daigle court
finally examined CERCLA's legislative history to ascertain whether it
clarified the language that had been adopted into law. Before analyzing the legislative history, the Tenth Circuit made a presumption
critical to its holding:6 9 it stated that the plaintiffs' request for medical monitoring expenses resembled a personal injury cause of action
70
for damagesY.
The court erred on this critical point. Medical
monitoring costs do not result from personal injury; rather, medical
monitoring is a public health-related procedure used to detect whether
any personal injury, in the form of chronic disease, has occurred. The
Tenth Circuit, however, pursued its analysis of the legislative history
beginning with that erroneous presumption. Noting the sparse
164. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535.
165. Id. (citing Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1247).
166. The court referred to the specific examples given by the drafters that include fencing,
alternate water supplies, and temporary housing. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535. The court noted that
the statute does not limit 'removal" costs to these specific examples, but that it is only reasonable
under traditional statutory canons of construction to conclude that any other recoverable costs
must be at least of a similar type. Id. (citing Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1247 & n.17, for its discus.
sion of ejusdem generis).
167. The plaintiffs requested monitoring 'to assist plaintiffs and class members in the
prevention or early detection and treatment of chronic disease." Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535

(citations omitted).
168. Id.
169. See Tanenbaum, Comment, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 941 (cited in note 10).
170. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535.
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legislative history supporting the definition of "response costs,"171 the
Daigle court stated that the history of CERCLA's enactment reveals
that both houses of Congress considered and purposefully rejected any
provision that would allow recovery of medical or other private
damages unrelated to the cleanup effort. 172 The court then referred to
the intentional deletion of any private cause of action for personal
injury by examining Senator Randolph's statement that Congress
"deleted the Federal cause of action for medical expenses or income
loss."173 The Tenth Circuit concluded that Senator Randolph's status
as co-sponsor of the compromise bill made his statements reliable
indicators of Congressional intent to exclude "medical expenses" from
recovery.'7 4 Further, the court noted that other Senators and
Representatives supported Senator Randolph's statements throughout
CERCLA's evolution,'17 thereby confirming the obvious implication
that Congress intentionally deleted all personal rights to recovery of
medical expenses from CERCLA.16
The Daiglecourt explained that its conclusion does not suggest
that CERCLA ignores public health; rather, the conclusion implies
that other provisions within CERCLA address these needs. The court
specifically noted that Section 104(i), which establishes the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), empowers the
"ATSDR177 to assess - the health effects of actual and threatened

171. Id. (citing Exxon v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355,373 (1986)).
172. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535. The court explained:
Each chamber of Congress considered Bills which contained provisions for causes of action
for certain economic damages and for personal injury. For example, the original House
Bill contained a provision for private recovery of 'all damages for personal injury, injury
to real or personal property, and economic loss, resulting from such release or threatened
release.' ... This provision did not make it out of committee, and the final Bill as enacted
by the House included no provision for medical expense recovery.... The Senate Bill also
contained a provision for private recovery of'all out-of-pocket medical expenses, including
rehabilitation costs or burial expenses, due to personal injury." But this provision was
later deleted by amendment, and H.R. 7020 was ultimately substituted as a compromise
bill, amended, enacted by both chambers and signed into law without any reference to
medical expenses.
Id. at 1535-36 (citations omitted). See also Exxon Corp., 475 U.S. at 366-67 n.8 (providing a
concise account of the bills Congress considered in the evolution of CERCLA).
173. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1536 (citing 126 Cong. Rec. 14964 (1980) (statement of Sen.
Randolph)).
174. Daigle,972 F.2d at 1536. See also North Haven Bd. ofEduc. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 52627 (1982) (noting the "authoritative' status of the remarks of a bill's sponsor).
175. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1536. In support of its conclusion, the court noted that Representative Gore expressed dismay at "the drastic whittling down of the original liability
provisions. . . ." Id. at n.7 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016, pt. I, at 62-65 (1980) (statement of
Representative Albert Gore)). The dissatisfaction with CERCLA expressed by Al Gore could
produce extensive proposals for change within CERCLA given his current office as vice-president.
176. Daigle,972 F.2d at 1536.
177. ATSDR's power comes from the 1986 SARA amendments. Id.
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hazardous substance releases through an elaborate array of
functions.178 The Tenth Circuit also dismissed the plaintiffs' argument
that the medical monitoring ("health surveillance") provisions under
104(i) indicate that the types of medical expenses intentionally
excluded from CERCLA response costs do not include medical
surveillance.lle
The Tenth Circuit explained that the deleted
provisions addressed the personal right to recover medical expenses
and not the comprehensive ATSDR health assessment procedures
enacted under SARA, and that ATSDR liability is distinguishable
from response costs."18° The Daigle court explained that Section
107(a) is a liability provision that provides the government a cause of
action for the recovery of Section 104(i) ATSDR health assessment
costs, which is separate from the cause of action for response costs.1 81
It concluded its analysis by stating that Congress's provision for
separate recovery and funding provisions for health assessment costs
indicates that such costs, including the medical monitoring the
plaintiffs sought, differ from response costs and therefore are not
available to private parties under the Section 107(a)(4)(B) liability
provision. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit held that, given the language of the response definitions and the history and structure of
CERCLA, the medical monitoring expenses that the plaintiffs sought
82
are not recoverable under CERCLA Section 107(a).1

178.

Id.

See generally Susan M. Cooke, The Law of Hazardous Waste, Management,

Cleanup, Liability and Litigation, § 13.01 at (4)(d)(vii) (MB, 1992) (reviewing the ATSDR health
assessment functions under CERCLA § 104(i) as amended by SARA). The court noted as an
example, that the ATSDR must conduct formal health assessments for every NPL facility
pursuant to CERCLA § 104(i)(6)(A), and that it is authorized to conduct formal health assessments on other sites if individuals or physicians provide information regarding human contact

with released hazardous materials pursuant to CERCLA § 104(i)(6)(B). Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1536
(citations omitted). Such individuals and physicians may petition the ATSDR to conduct a health
assessment, and the ATSDR must provide a written explanation of why an assessment is
inappropriate in case of a denial. Id. Depending on the results of a health assessment that is
performed, the ATSDR is empowered, under CERCLA § 104(i)(7), to conduct pilot epidemiological
studies, and, under CERCIA § 104(i)(8), to establish a registry of persons that have been exposed
and in the event of a serious health risk, establish a long-term "health surveillance program" to
include 'periodical medical testing" and treatment referral mechanisms for those persons who are

screened positive. Daigle,972 F.2d at 1537 (citations omitted).
179. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1537.
180. Id.
181. Id. See text accompanying note 177. Compare CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(D), which deals
with health assessment costs, with subsection (4)(A), which addresses response costs. CERCLA §

111 provides Superfimd reimbursement for § 104(i) ATSDR health assessment costs separately

from reimbursement fdr response costs. Compare CERCLA § 111(a)(1) (addressing funding
authorization for general response costs) with § 111(c)(4) & (n)(addressing funding authorization
for ATSDR costs). See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1537 (offering the above comparisons).
182. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1537.
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D. Analyzing the Daigle Opinion and Assessing Its Potency
As the first Circuit Court ruling on the subject, the Tenth
Circuit's opinion is a potentially powerful precedent in the area of
recovery of medical monitoring costs under CERCLA. Although the
decision may be influential in courts' future decisions, it is important
to consider its deficiencies.
Two of the court's important premises could limit the decision's
impact: (1) the finding that CERCLA's purpose is narrow and (2) the
court's characterization of the plaintiffs' claims as seeking compensation for personal injuries. The court first analyzed CERCLA's structure with the premise that the statute has a narrow purpose;
Congress enacted it to facilitate the expeditious cleanup of
environmental contamination caused by hazardous waste releases. 1 3
The court noted that Section 107(a) in particular facilitates the
cleanup of hazardous waste sites by shifting liability for cleanup costs
to responsible parties.184 Conversely, other courts and scholars have
stated that CERCLA has as many as three purposes: the facilitation
of cleanup, protection of the public health, and deterrence of
environmental contamination.18 5
If the statute's purpose is considered a broad attempt to
further the public health and welfare or to deter environmental
releases at the outset, the appropriateness of medical monitoring costs
seems more compelling, and their usefulness to further these
objectives is readily apparent. Alternatively, under a narrow reading
of the statute's purpose medical monitoring costs seem unrelated to
this purpose; medical monitoring rarely would facilitate cleanup or
prevent contact between the environmental release and the public
because the release and the cleanup of environmental contamination
will at least have begun and possibly been completed before the
medical monitoring indicates the development of latent disease.
In Daigle, the Tenth Circuit asserted one purpose of the legislation that was consistent with its analysis, yet ignored the existence
of any other purposes.1 8 As statutory interpretation scholars Profes183. Id. at 1533.
184. See id. and text accompanying notes 143-44.

185. See Grad, 8 Colum. J. Envir. L. at 2 (cited in note 4) (stating that CERCLA, combined
with Subtitle C of RCRA, form a sufficient authorization to begin the cleanup of old hazardous
waste sites and to avoid the consequences of new hazardous waste spills, for the protection of
health and the environment). See also Tanenbaum, Comment, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 949-50 (cited
in note 10) (arguing that CERCLA and particularly § 107(a) were enacted with a broad public

health purpose that could not be effectuated without the recovery of medical monitoring costs).
186. In Daigle, the Tenth Circuit is guilty of the same mistake the Supreme Court made in
the landmark case of United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In that case, the Court
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sors Frickey and Eskridge note, however, complex compromises are
endemic in the legislative process; therefore, legislation frequently
7
reflects different and possibly conflicting purposes. 8
A better-reasoned opinion would have acknowledged that protection of the public health and deterrence of hazardous releases also
are goals of CERCLA. The court then could have justified its conclusion by noting that the legislative history suggests that public health
is not a principle Congress was willing to implement unconditionally
and at any expense. 18 Even more praiseworthy, the court could have
acknowledged that CERCLA's purpose may not be discernible.
Although the Tenth Circuit's treatment of CERCLA's purpose seems
to be a major deficiency in its decision, it is somewhat irrelevant; the
purpose the court attributed to CERCLA is relevant to its position on
the recoverability of medical monitoring costs, but it is not
determinative. Even assuming that CERCLA seeks to facilitate
cleanup, protect the public health and welfare, and deter hazardous
releases, a sound textual analysis supported by an examination of the
legislative history demonstrates Congress's unwillingness to adopt a
law that would place unconditional liability on responsible parties.
Moreover, few disagree that sound statutory interpretation begins
with the text, 8 9 and the strength of the Tenth Circuit's opini6n in
Daigle stems from its thorough textual analysis supported by a
thoughtful examination of the legislative history. Although the court
examined the legislative purpose, it clearly was not the focus of the
court's opinion.
The Daigle court's second assumption that threatens to weaken
the opinion's precendential value is the Tenth Circuit's
characterization of the medical monitoring claim as an attempt to
recover personal injury damages. The Tenth Circuit found that the
plaintiffs' request for medical monitoring to allow prevention or early
detection and treatment of chronic diseases "smacks of a cause of
action for damages resulting from personal injury." 90 The legislative
history rather unambiguously eliminates any cause of action for

asserted the result-oriented purpose of Title VII, that of achieving nondiscrimination, and ignored
the color-blindness purpose. By asserting one purpose and suppressing the other, scholars argue,
the Court in Weber distorted the evidence and overstated its argument. Eskridge and Frickey, 42
Stan. L. Rev. at 336 (cited in note 25).

187. See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 336-37.
188. See id. at 336 (commenting that the statutory exceptions for small businesses and union
seniority in Title VII denonstrate that nondiscrimination was not a purpose Congress was willing

to implement at any price).
189. See id. at 337.

190. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535. See text accompanying notes 170-72.
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personal injury. 191 Arguably, however, medical monitoring is an
attempt to further the public health and welfare and is unrelated to
any claim for personal injury.1 92 If this statement is true, the court's
premise for analyzing the legislative history is invalid and drains the
opinion of validity.
This observation also appears more problematic at first glance
than it actually is. Regardless of the label placed on the plaintiffs'
claim, it appears the claim would be unable to clear the hurdle presented by the plain language 'of the provisions when viewed in the
context of the remainder of CERCLA. CERCLA does not contemplate
medical monitoring costs; the examples of what it does cover involve
preventing further physical contact between the contaminants and the
public, not monitoring the effects of that contact.
This Recent Development argues that Daigle may leave a gap
in the law-CERCLA explicitly excludes medical monitoring expenses
only if characterized as a cause of action for damages resulting from
personal injury. Despite this lacuna, judges interpreting Section
107(a)(4)(B) in the future will be hard-pressed to grant medical
monitoring costs when faced with precedent demonstrating that
medical monitoring costs are entirely different than other actions
considered in CERCLNs liability provisions and that the statute
contemplates medical monitoring in other sections.
As demonstrated by the analyses of the Brewer and Coburn
lines of cases, a court's method of statutory interpretation dramatically influences whether plaintiffs can recover medical monitoring
expenses under CERCLA. Beyond strictly examining the definitions,
the courts' methods of statutory interpretation differ wildly. Daigles
analysis is similar to Coburn's in that it proceeds from the provided
definitions to an examination of their context and the relationship
between those provisions and the general structure of CERCLA. The
Tenth Circuit could have ended its analysis with this sound textual
approach, but it looked further to the legislative history for support of
its textual interpretation. Finding support for its position in the
legislative history, the Tenth Circuit virtually ended its statutory
analysis at that point. Although the Tenth Circuit's conclusion in
Daigle is correct-medical monitoring costs are not "necessary costs of
response"-a dynamic approach to the interpretation of CERCLA
would have been meritorious. 9 3 Considering CERCLA's overtly
191. See notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
192. See Tanenbaum, Comment, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev at 938-40 (cited in note 10).

193. See Part I (discussing the statutory interpretation of the Brewer court) for a discussion
of the merits of dynamic interpretation, particularly practical reasoning.

268

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:235

ambiguous language and arguably indeterminate legislative history, a
dynamic interpretation would consider the factors that prompted
CERCLA's enactment, as well as the current values influencing its
interpretation. Although the result probably would be the same, the
inaccurate assumptions on which the court based its analysis
194
significantly undermine the opinion.
E. Resolution of the Issue Outside of CERCLA
The Tenth Circuit's holding that medical monitoring costs are
not "necessary costs of response" leaves unresolved the issue of recoverability of medical monitoring costs. Thus, it is appropriate to inquire whether common law provides persons with an adequate remedy
and whether it is a more appropriate avenue to pursue recovery of
medical monitoring expenses.
Plaintiffs increasingly plead common-law tort theories of liability in environmental cleanup actions, particularly the abnormally
dangerous activities doctrine, because, among other reasons, tort
claims may offer them damages not easily recovered under
CERCLA.195 Medical monitoring costs provide a prominent example.196
To establish a claim under the abnormally dangerous activities
doctrine, the plaintiff need not establish duty, breach of duty,
causation, and damages as in negligence cases. 19 Courts must decide
as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage whether an
activity is "abnormally dangerous."'98 Some courts have denied
recovery of medical monitoring costs as "necessary costs of response,"
but have upheld common-law tort claims for the same expenses. 99
They have held under common-law tort theory that medical
monitoring is a clearly recoverable future medical cost. 20° These

194. See Daigle,972 F.2d at 1535.
195. Jim C. Chen and Kyle E. McSlarrow, Application of the Abnormally Dangerous
Activities Doctrine to Environmental Cleanups,47 Bus. Law. 1031 (1992).
196. Id. at 1045.
197. Id. at 1033.
198. For a thorough discussion of the abnormally dangerous activites doctrine, see generally
id. at 1031.
199. See, for example, Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 904-05 (D.Minn. 1987).
See also Chen and McSlarrow, 47 Bus. Law. at 1045-46 (cited in note 195).
200. Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 904-05. See also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d
829, 849-52 (3d Cir. 1990) (considering a petitioner's common-law claim for medical monitoring
expenses and holding the cause of action cognizable in Pennsylvania to cover costs of periodic
medical examinations needed to protect against exacerbation of latent diseases brought about by
exposure to hazardous substances); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847, 848.52
(M.D. Pa. 1988) (finding that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the costs of periodic medical
examination made necessary by significantly enhanced risk of serious disease); Ayers v. Township
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decisions are particularly potent because common-law claims also
allow plaintiffs to discover facts to support subsequent claims for
personal injury,20 1 actions that were deleted from the final CERCLA
bill.
One may argue that if tort law provides the remedy then
CERCLA need not. Moreover, the argument may follow that because
CERCLA defines potentially responsible parties so broadly and contains no causation requirement, requiring parties to pay medical
monitoring costs under CERCLA as well would impose crushing liability on potentially responsible parties. Furthermore, these same per20 2
sons may argue that Congress intended the common law to govern,
or at the least, that issues left unresolved by a statute fall outside its
domain.=
This Author agrees that CERCLA does not contemplate
medical monitoring costs in its current form, but disagrees with arguments that it would be inappropriate for "necessary costs of response" under CERCLA to encompass medical monitoring costs.
CERCLA is a hazardous waste cleanup bill. It would seem appropriate for the statute to cover all aspects of the cleanup process: First,
hazardous waste releases will not be deterred if responsible parties
are not required to pay the full costs of all their activities. Second,
judicial efficiency would suggest that all claims should be pursued in
the federal courts under CERCLA. Judicial efficiency, however, is not
a reason to go beyond the actual text of the statute. Rather, Congress
should amend CERCLA so that its text provides for the recovery of
medical monitoring costs.
The argument that allowing recovery of medical monitoring
costs would "load up" CERCLA in the absence of a causation requirement is equally unpersuasive for two reasons. First, medical monitoring costs are inexpensive compared to the other costs associated with
cleaning up a hazardous waste site, and therefore would not add an
outrageous amount to the total cleanup bill. Second, the lack of a
causation requirement does not justify refusing to allow the recovery
of medical monitoring costs under CERCLA because the alternative
remedy would be the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine, a strict
ofJackson, 525 A.2d 287, 308-15 (N.J. 1987) (holding that residents were entitled to damages for
the cost of medical surveillance based upon enhanced future risk of disease).
201. Chen and McSlarrow, 47 Bus. Law. at 1046 (cited in note 195).
202. See 126 Cong. Rec. 14964 (1980) (recording Senator Randolph as stating that '[i]t is
intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any, shall be governed by traditional
and evolving principles 6f common lawn).
203. See Easterbrook, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 544 (cited in note 34) (stating that 'unless the
statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law, the domain of
the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by its framers).
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liability claim that similarly does not contain a causation requirement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Examined independently, words have numerous meanings. It
is from their context that the reader can determine precisely what the
writer intended. When looking at the words of Section 107(a)(4)(B) in
the context of the entire Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), the legislative history,
and the "lets make a deal" legislative process, it appears that the
drafters, as the Tenth Circuit concluded in Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., did
not contemplate the recovery of medical monitoring costs under this
statute. 20 4 The examples of "removal" and "remedial action" supplied
by Congress are unrelated to medical monitoring of the public health,
and instead refer only to containing and cleaning up hazardous waste.
The monitoring contemplated consists of means to prevent further
physical contact between contaminants and the public. Moreover,
medical monitoring costs are mentioned in the legislative history, but
their recovery was not incorporated into CERCLA's language.
This reality does not suggest that medical monitoring is not a
valuable and an appropriate means of assessing damage to the public
and the environment from hazardous waste exposure. This Recent
Development calls for legislative reform that explicitly allows for
medical monitoring, so that courts and injured parties can stop
construing the enacted legislation to say something it does not.
As currently written, CERCLA does not provide for the recovery of medical monitoring expenses and thereby deprives the public of
a valuable tool in assessing the impact of hazardous chemicals on both
the environment and people. This omission is an enormous gap in the
law, leaving courts like Daigle no choice but to interpret CERCLA as
excluding medical monitoring costs. Rather than advocating judicial
lawmaking, this Recent Development pleads for legislative reform.
Amended legislation should make responsible parties liable not only
for environmental damage, but also for harm suffered by the public.
Explicit legislation that defines medical monitoring costs,
204. See Senate Debate on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), in which Senator George Mitchell stated that "[u]nder this bill, if
a toxic waste discharge'injures both a tree and a person, the tree's owner, if it is a government,
can promptly recover... for the cost of repairing the damage, but the person cannot. In effect,..
. it is alright to kill people, but not trees." 126 Cong. Rec. 30941 (1980) (statement of Senator
Mitchell).
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distinguishes them from personal injury causes of action, and
delineates exactly when a plaintiff may recover them, would serve as
a valuable tool for preventing and detecting human disease resulting
from exposure to toxic chemicals.
This Recent Development not only supports the view that
medical monitoring costs are not "necessary costs of response" under
Section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA, 205 but more importantly, it advocates
immediate and well-thought-out legislative action °6 to allow for
medical monitoring as a "necessary cost of response." Not only is
medical monitoring an invaluable tool for assessing the effects of
hazardous substances on the public health and the environment, but
recovery of these costs is required if CERCLA is to fulfill its intended

205. The University of Chicago Law Review has published a Comment on the topic of
recovering medical monitoring costs under CERCLA. See Tanenbaum, Comment, 59 U. Chi. L.
Rev. at 925 (cited in note 10). Although both the Tanenbaum Comment and this Recent
Development recognize the value of medical monitoring as a tool in the prevention and detection
of disease, the pieces reach opposite conclusions. See id. at 926-27. The Tanenbaum piece
concludes that 'necessary response costs" under CERCLA include medical monitoring costs, but
this Recent Development concludes that medical monitoring costs are not necessary costs of
response under CERCLA as currently written. A critical difference in these pieces is the
approach to the issue of statutory interpretation. This Recent Development advocates an
approach that is not purely textualist, intentionalist, or purposivist. See Eskridge and Frickey, 42
Stan. L. Rev. at 324-45 (cited in note 25) (pointing out the weaknesses of these approaches).
Rather, it asserts a dynamic approach that begins with a thorough examination of the text in the
context of the entire statute, supported by further examination of the legislative history,
legislative purposes, the evolution of the statute, and current policy. See id. at 345-62 for an indepth discussion of dynamic statutory interpretation, particularly the Practical Reasoning
Approach.
In contrast, the Tanenbaum Comment seems to advocate a purposivist approach-interpreting the Act according to its actual or presumed purpose. The Comment
approaches purposivism consistent with the method advocated by non-public choice legal scholars.
See Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process at 166-67 (cited in note 38); Eskridge and Frickey, 42
Stan. L. Rev at 333. This method basically entails deciding what purpose should be attributed to
the statute and the subordinate provision in question, and then interpreting the words in question
to carry out that purpose.
This Recent Development suggests two flaws in Tanenbaum's analysis. First, Tanenbaum
asserts the public health purpose of CERCLA and glosses over any examples in the statute that
appear inconsistent with that purpose in order to allow § 107(4) to carry out that purpose.
Professors Eskridge and Frickey point out some of the flaws of that type of analysis, namely, the
reliance on unrealistic assumptions, indeterminacy, and the often competing values apparent in
legislation. See Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 332-45. Moreover, public choice
scholars recognize that legislation does not have a discernible or laudable purpose. Second, even
a true purposivist thoroughly examines the text of the statute. Professors Eskridge and Frickey
state that courts most often begin with the text, and textual arguments carry the greatest weight.
Id. at 354-56. Without a hard look at the language in the context of the entire statute, the
Tanenbaum Comment seems unpersuasive. All of its arguments concerning the value of medical
monitoring as a tool in the prevention, detection, and treatment of disease are undisputed,
however, in this Recent Development.
206. The legislativi history shouts of Al Gore's disgust with the whittling away at recovery
available under CERCLA. See note 175 and accompanying text. It is entirely possible that the
legislature could take action putting some teeth into CERCLA, or enact legislation that
appropriately allows for medical monitoring expenses.
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function. CERCLA has dual purposes: to deter environmental
releases and to facilitate cleanup after a release occurs. Common
sense dictates that in order for a liability rule to function properly, all
the costs incurred must be included in the penalty. An inadequate
penalty will not serve the deterrence function, thereby defeating the
purposes of the law. Without an amendment to CERCLA, the public
is left virtually without protection under CERCLA-unable to recover
for physical injury and unable to recover costs to monitor whether
exposure could eventually lead to a deadly disease with the potential
20
to infect an entire community.
The time is ripe, with President Bill Clinton and Vice-President
Al Gore in office, to move for clear environmental laws that leave
courts no choice but to grant recovery for medical monitoring costs.
When the legislature goes in to play "lets make a deal," they will know
that the executive's priority will be to protect the people from the
industries as opposed to protecting the industries from the people.
CERCLA currently does not meet society's needs because its
ambiguous wording leaves courts a back door that is left perpetually
open.
Kristin Elizabeth Sweeney

207. See note 204 (referring to statement of Senator Mitchell).

